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NOTES
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS A BASIS FOR PROSECUTION, ARREST
AND SEARCH
Pre-trial criminal procedure in the form of instigation of prosecu-
tion, arrest and search contains the threat of harm to the suspect even
before trial. The instigation of prosecution results in a trial with its
attendant publicity and injury to reputation. Arrest causes a restraining
of physical liberty, while a search involves the invasion of private prem-
ises and the possibility of property seizure. Although these actions are
taken without affording the injured party an opportunity for a hearing,
each involves an ex parte decision by an official or official body as to
whether the particular action should be taken. The grand jury decides
if an indictment should be returned. A peace officer decides if an arrest
should be made without a warrant and if the arrested person should be
searched. A magistrate decides if a criminal information is sufficient
for prosecution, if a warrant for arrest should be issued or if a search
warrant should be allowed. The severity of the harms to the individual
involved argues against the exercise of untrammeled discretion in such
decisions, however, the public interest in swift capture and prosecution
of suspected offenders argues against the erection of elaborate safe-
guards from these harms. The evidentiary standards which have evolved
from this clash of interests constitute a legitimate subject of inquiry to
determine; first, whether the courts will review the evidence on which
a prosecution, arrest or search is based, and if so whether second or
third-hand information is capable of supplying sufficient probabiilty of
guilt to justify these actions. In each situation, reconciling the public
interest against the private determines the boundaries of the discretion
of the official or official body, and as a corollary, the evidentiary re-
quirement to be applied.
Instigation of Prosecution
Prosecution is begun either by the return of an indictment by the
grand jury after deliberation in secret session1 or by the filing of an in-
formation by the prosecutor.2
1. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 135-193 (1946).
2. Id. at 194-265.
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(1) Grand Jury
Since the members of the grand jury do not themselves observe the
commission of offenses, they must depend upon the testimony of wit-
nesses to give them a second-hand view of the events as they actually
occurred. If the witness claims to have observed the commission of the
offense himself then the grand jury, like all triers of fact, receives the
information second-hand. However, if the witness before the grand
jury testifies not that he observed the offense himself, but merely that
he talked with another person who claimed to have observed the offense
then that information, which would be characterized at a trial as hearsay,
gives the grand jury only a third-hand view of the facts.
In reference to the review of the evidence presented to the grand
jury, the courts have generally taken one of two positions:
1. The return of an indictment is conclusive proof that
evidence of guilt of the accused was heard at the inquest.3
2. Although the grand jury need not be presented with
evidence sufficient for a conviction, if the accused can show
that no evidence of guilt was presented at the inquest, then
the indictment should be quashed.4
In the recent tax evasion case of Costello v. United States,' the only
evidence offered before the federal grand jury was a net worth summary
of Costello's expenditures which had been prepared by internal revenue
agents from information given them by persons with whom Costello had
done business. Since the agents could testify only to what others had told
them about Costello's expenditures, the information was third-hand when
it reached the grand jury. Costello moved to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury.
The United States Supreme Court sustained the indictment on the ground
that for reasons of expediency in criminal proceedings it was beyond the
province of the court to question the sufficiency of the evidence pre-
sented before the grand jury. Justice Black said, ". . . if indictments
were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate
or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would
be great indeed. . . . [A] n indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if
3. Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N.E. 633 (1933) ; Mack v. State, 203 Ind.
355, 180 N.E. 279 (1931) ; Pick v. State, 143 Md. 192, 121 Atl. 918 (1913); Smith v.
State, 61 Miss. 754 (1884) ; Oa-=D, op. cit. supra note 1, at 163.
4. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928) ; see cases collected annot.,
59 A.L.R. 567 (1929) ; ORFmLD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 163-166; contra. N.Y. CODE CRlM.
PRoc. § 258 (1938), People v. Nicosia, 164 Misc. 152, 289 N.Y. Supp. 591 (1937).
5. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits."'
The Costello case indicates that at present the only protection in the
federal courts against an unfounded indictment rests in the collective
conscience of the grand jury. If the grand jury is satisfied that an in-
dictment should be returned, their decision cannot be questioned. The
court reasoned that the validity of the indictment did not affect the fair-
ness of the trial, and that the private interests invaded by an unfounded
trial were less important than the public interest in swift prosecution of
suspected offenders.7
Prior to the Costello case, the circuit courts had generally agreed
with the majority of the state courts that an indictment not founded on
some evidence of guilt should be quashed.' When the Costello case was
before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the indictment was sus-
tained.9 However, Judge Hand adopted the position that "[I] f it ap-
peared that no evidence had been offered that rationally established the
facts, the indictment ought to be quashed, . . . but that this is in no
sense true hearsay . . . [I]t may be as dependable a reliance at a trial
as any other evidence, the only condition being that the opposite party
shall not object to it," and since "the accused is normally not present at
an inquest and cannot cross examine . . . we hold that it is immaterial
that only hearsay was adduced at the inquest in support of the allega-
tions of the indictment. . . . "" Thus, the Second Circuit, while re-
viewing the evidence presented to the grand jury, held that hearsay was
capable of rationally establishing the facts and supporting the indictment.
Judge Hand's test of the evidence would be one of relevancy" and
credibility 2 rather than strict admissability. However, saying that the
indictment will not be quashed when it is founded on hearsay is not say-
ing that any hearsay evidence is sufficient. In the Costello case the grand
jury received its information third-hand since the testimony of the gov-
ernment agents was founded on interviews with business people who did
not testify and examinations of their records which were not produced
at the inquest. To require that the originals of the records be brought to
the inquest would have involved great inconvenience and delay. Like-
wise, because of the lack of motive to falsify and the small amount of
6. Id. at 363.
7. Id. at 364.
8. See cases collected annot. 59 A.L.R. 567 (1929).
9. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955) ; see notes, 43 CAL. L. R.
859 (1955) ; 104 U. PA. L. REv. 429 (1955) ; 65 YALE L.J. 390 (1956).
10. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 at 677-679 (2nd Cir. 1955).
11. The evidence before the grand jury must be relevant to the commission of a
crime by the accused. Dong Haw v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 2d 153, 183 P.2d 724
(1947).
12. See note 14 infra.
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information to which each could testify, the increased probability of
truth afforded by requiring direct testimony from all the persons inter-
viewed would not have justified that increased time required to hear
their testimony. Even though part of the evidence in the Costello case
might not have been admissable at a trial there was substantial prob-
ability of its truth since the internal revenue agents had no apparent rea-.
son for testifying falsely. As Judge Hand pointed out, it was the rele-
vancy and credibility and not the admissability of the evidence that de-
termined its sufficiency to support the indictment.
In the embezzlement case of United States v. Farrington,3 the in-
dictment was quashed when an attorney representing creditors of a bank
who were interested in seeing the accused prosecuted appeared before the
grand jury and urged the return of an indictment. He was allowed to
quote entries picked at will from the companies' books, as well as ex-
cerpts from testimony which the accused had given before the commis-
sioner. The fact that the witness had a personal interest in testifying in a
manner that would encourage the return of an indictment destroyed the
credibility of his testimony, making it incapable of rationally establishing
the facts.14 The indictment was quashed for there was no other evidence
to support it.
Although before the Costello case, the courts may have been think-
ing in terms of Judge Hand's test of evidence that rationally established
the facts, the standard that many courts purported to impose was that of
"some legally competent evidence" at the inquest.' 5 Although this rule
paid lip service to admissability, it is obvious that its real purpose was
to protect the accused from an unwarranted trial-an end that could best
be served by applying the rules of relevancy and credibility. An example
of the extension of this test to reach much the same result as the Costello
test is seen in Murdick v. United States," a prosecution for mail theft.
There the only witnesses before the grand jury were two postal inspec-
tors, neither of whom had witnessed any aspect of the crime, but both
of whom had talked to the witnesses and to the defendant. The de-
fendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it was based
solely on hearsay. The court sustained the indictment saying that since
at the trial the inspectors had testified to certain admissions made by
13. 5 Fed. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881).
14. Accord, People v. Nicosia, 164 Misc. 152, 289 N.Y. Supp. 591 (1937) (con-
fessed perjurers testimony before grand jury not sufficient) ; People v. Nitzberg, 289
N.Y. 523, 47 N.E.2d 37 (1943) (accomplices under indictment whereby prosecutor could
exert pressure for testimony favorable to return of indictment).
15. E.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Cox v. Vaught, 52 F.2d 562
(10th Cir. 1931); ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 162-164.
16. 15 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1926).
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the defendant, it was to be presumed that they had also so testified at the
inquest, and that the indictment could not be quashed since it was pre-
sumed to be founded on some competent evidence. By applying a pre-
sumption that a witness capable of introducing competent evidence had
done so before the grand jury, the court avoided quashing an indictment
which the words of the "some legally competent evidence test" would
seem to have demanded.17
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in the Costello case, al-
though the objection that no evidence of guilt was heard by the grand
jury is still very much alive in state courts, it is no longer valid in federal
courts, and if an indictment is returned, regardless of the evidence before
the grand jury, the accused must stand trial.
(2) Information
As Justice Black's dictum indicates, much of what has been said of
the indictment also applies to the information filed by the prosecutor.
Although prosecution in the federal system must be by indictment unless
waived, 8 many states offer the alternative of prosecution by informa-
tion. The offenses which may be so prosecuted differ greatly among the
states, some allowing the information to be used for misdemeanors only,
others permitting its use for major felonies." A preliminary examina-
tion before a magistrate is usually required for the filing of an informa-
tion.2" If the person appearing before the magistrate claims to have
personally witnessed the offense, then the magistrate's information is
second-hand. If, however, the witness claims only to have talked with
a person who witnessed the offense, the magistrate, like the grand jury
in the Costello case, is dealing with third-hand information. Since the
preliminary examination is designed to offer much the same protection
as the grand jury inquest, the courts have usually taken similar positions
as to the evidentiary requirements of the indictment and the information.
In some states no preliminary examination is required and the filing of
an information is enough to call for a trial.2' Others would agree that
the insufficiency of the evidence before the magistrate is not a ground
for quashing the information, but that if no evidence indicating the guilt
of the accused was presented to the magistrate, the information should
17. Accord, Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1955).
18. FED. R. CRiM. P. 3, 4, 41.
19. See ORFIELD, op. cit. su-pra note 1 at 209-210; Moley, The Use of the Iforina-
tion in Criminal Cases 17 A.B.A.J. 292 (1931).
20. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 214.
21. Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa and Louisiana require no pre-
liminary examination. See ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 215.
NOTES
be quashed.22 Since the proceedings before the magistrate are not secret
and the accused is present, some degree of protection from totally un-
founded prosecution is afforded; however, when no preliminary examina-
tion is required this protection is lost. It has been argued that since it
is not politically expedient for unfounded trials to be begun by the prose-
cutor, the accused is still effectively protected.2" It can also be argued
that the interests invaded by unfounded prosecutions deserve greater
protection than the conscience of the prosecutor, and that since cases are
occasionally dismissed by magistrates, it is evident that prosecutors some-
times do attempt to instigate unfounded prosecutions.24 It seems doubt-
ful that the protection offered an accused in a preliminary examination
before a minor public official is as great as that offered by the collective
conscience of a grand jury, but even assuming that a preliminary exam-
ination affords the same degree of protection as a grand jury inquest, in
those jurisdictions which require no formal preliminary proceedings, but
leave the determination in the hands of the prosecutor, all protection
vanishes. The accused must stand trial regardless of the evidence on
which the information is based.
The standards applied to the indictment and information demon-
strate that if any protection is to be given the interests invaded by un-
warranted prosecution, it is at most the protection from entirely arbitrary
prosecution initiated prior to any showing that evidence of the guilt of
the accused is in existence. The public expense of an unfounded trial is
probably as great an incentive toward such a rule as is any private interest
served. If review is allowed Judge Hand's test indicates that for pur-
poses of prosecution hearsay evidence, if relevant and credible, is capable
of rationally establishing the facts. If the Hand test is adopted in the
state courts, then a distinction will in all probability be drawn, as it has
in the arrest and search cases, between that hearsay which is capable of
rationally establishing the facts and that which is not.
Arrest
Although not all courts will review the informational basis support-
ing instigation of prosecution, all courts afford an opportunity for the
review of the information on which an arrest is based. Arrest causes
an invasion of the interest of freedom of activity as well as the harm
to reputation involved in criminal prosecution. An arrest may be made
22. Ramirez v. State, 55 Ariz. 441, 103 P.2d 459 (1940) ; State v. Hunt, 57 Idaho
122, 62 P.2d 1372 (1936) ; State v. Gottwalt, 209 Minn. 4, 295 N.W. 67 (1940). Contra.,
People v. Schuber, 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945) ; People v. Lee, 231 Mich.
607, 204 N.W. 742 (1925) ; Ex. parte Brewer, 75 Okla. Crim. 150, 129 P.2d 199 -(1942).
23. O rIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 99.
24. Id. at 97.
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on the basis of a warrant issued by a magistrate to whom it has been
demonstrated that there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of
an offense.25 An arrest may also be made by a peace officer without a
warrant when a misdemeanor is committed in his presence or when he
has probable cause to believe that a felony has been or is being com-
mitted by the person arrested.2 6
(1) Arrest Without A Warrant
Although, in view of his mobility, it might be possible to require that
a peace officer personally witness the facts on which he bases his decision
to arrest, such personal knowledge is not required. The officer, 'like any
trier of fact whose determination rests upon testimony from witnesses,
may base an arrest on second-hand information.
It is well settled that a report from a credible informant who claims
to be an eyewitness to a felony is sufficient to establish probable cause
for an officer to arrest without a warrant." In Budreau v. State, 8 a
minister told a constable that he had seen the defendant, who was ap-
parently intoxicated, driving a car, and that the defendant had invited
him to the car for a drink. These facts were sufficient to allow the con-
stable to arrest for illegal transportation of liquor. Likewise, in People
v. De Cesare,2 0 the arrest was sustained when a meat market proprietor
told the sheriff that the defendant had offered to sell him whiskey which
he had said he had in his car. These cases also illustrate that the in-
formant need not be an eyewitness to the actual commission of the of-
fense by the arrested party. He need only witness facts which point to-
ward guilt of the accused, not establish it.30
In Grow v. Forge,31 when a fifteen year old boy positively identified
the plaintiff as a man who had attempted to rob him, the arrest was sus-
tained.32 Here, the informant, while of good character, was of question-
25. FED. R. CRIf. P. 3; ORFIELD, op. Cit. supra note 1 at 9-11.
26. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 14-23; CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 93
(1926).
27. See CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra note 26 at 120-132 and cases cited therein. One
writer asserts that the opposite is the rule in federal law. FRAENKEL, Search and Seizure
Developments in Federal Law Since 1948, 41 IOWA L. REV. 67, 70 (1955).
28. 197 Ind. 8, 149 N.E. 442 (1925).
29. 22 Mich. 417, 190 N.W. 302 (1922).
30. Accord, Johnson v. Collins, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 375, 89 S.W. 253 (1905) ; Brish v.
Carter, 98 Md. 445, 57 At. 210 (1904). Naturally, if the informant does not charge
the accused with a crime, his information is of no value. Cunningham v. Baker, 104
Ala. 160, 16 So. 68, 53 Am. St. Rep. 27 (1894). Nor is the information of value if the
facts reported do not indicate the guilt of the accused. Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286,
64 N.E. 875 (1902) ; Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N.W. 999, 35 Am. St. Rep. 603
(1893).
31. 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369, 3 A.L.R. 642 (1919).
32. Accord, Bushardt v. United Investment Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637, 35
A.L.R. 637 (1922).
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able reliability, but the officer, being face to face with his informant,
could make a reasonable evaluation of the probability of the accuracy of
the information. Also the informant claimed to have witnessed the
actual commission of the crime by the accused. These two factors com-
bined were sufficient to justify the arrest.
The claim of a credible informant that he has witnessed the commis-
sion of the offense seems to carry great weight toward establishing prob-
able cause. But what if the informant does not claim to be an eyewit-
ness? In Elardo v. State,33 the arrest was not sustained when one Weir
told the deputy sheriff, "I have information that there is a load of liquor
stuck over by Mr. Vardaman's house" and that the defendant was in
charge of it. The court said that the information communicated must
be of facts within the informant's personal knowledge. Although second-
hand information from a credible informant is capable of giving the
arresting officer the required probable cause, apparently third-hand in-
formation is not, and in this sense the discretion of the officer is more
limited than that of the grand jury which could return an indictment
based on third-hand information.
It is probably not required that the informant actually have wit-
nessed the facts which he reports, only that he claim to have witnessed
such facts. It is also required that the officer assure himself prior to
the arrest that the informant does claim his information to be first hand.
In United States v. Clark,34 narcotics agents saw the defendant, a
known addict, leave a store which was suspected of being a front for
illegal narcotics sales. Her companion, a previously reliable informant,
gave a signal indicating that the defendant was carrying narcotics, but
since the narcotics agents, when they made the arrest, did not know
whether their informant claimed to have seen the narcotics on the de-
fendant's person, the arrest was not sustained. If the officer is to be
allowed any freedom of action, a finding of probable cause cannot de-
pend on the true state of the facts, but only on their apparent state at
the time of the arrest.35 The requirement that the officer determine only
that a credible informant claims personal knowledge of the facts affords
as much protection to the arrested party as the circumstances will allow.
The officers may substantiate the fact that the informant's informa-
tion is first hand by witnessing him in the process of collecting it. In
Matters v. United States,"S the officers searched the informant, and find-
33. 164 Miss. 628, 145 So. 615 (1933).
34. 29 F.Supp. 138 (D.C. W.D. Mo. 1939).
35. For example of judicial techniques in examination of facts for determination
of probable cause, see United States v. Horton, 86 F.Supp. 92 (D.C.W.D. Mich. 1949).
36. 11 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1926).
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ing no narcotics, they gave him marked bills and watched him enter the
defendant's house. He emerged and handed over a packet of morphine;
it was held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant.
A possible exception to the rule requiring that the officer inform
himself whether his informant claims first hand knowledge of the facts
reported occurs when such information comes from an official source
through law enforcement channels. In United States v. Heitner" of fi-
cers were told by police radio that the defendant was operating an illegal
still at a given place. On arriving, the officers saw the defendant hastily
leaving the building and arrested him. The arrest was sustained.3" Like-
wise, in Bartlett v. United States,39 F.B.I. agents who were informed by
phone from their headquarters that the defendant was an escaped felon
driving a stolen car, had probable cause to make the arrest when they
found the car beside the motel in which the defendant was sleeping. This
exception to the rule requiring that the informant claim first hand knowl-
edge of the facts may be at least partially explained by the decreased
probability of distortion of the information when transmitted through
official channels by law enforcement officers. Also, to require that an
informant such as the police radio operator personally witness the facts
supporting each transmission would destroy all value of communication
devices to law enforcement agencies.
Another possible exception to the rule requiring that the informant
claim first hand knowledge of facts pointing toward the guilt of the
accused occurs when the informant predicts a future offense. Since the
offense has not yet been committed, the informant could know of no
facts creating suspicion of the present guilt of the accused. In Wisniew-
ski v. United States,4" an informant who had given accurate information
four times before told the officers that the defendant was to make a de-
livery of illegal liquor at a given place using one of two autos. When
the defendant arrived in such a car, was seen talking to a known boot-
legger, and took a burlap sack and jug from the rear of his car, it was
held that the officers were entitled to make the arrest. It is questionable
whether such a prediction alone is sufficient to establish probable cause
37. 149 F.2d 105 (2nd Cir. 1945).
38. Accord, Gilliam v. United States, 189 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1951) ; State ex rel.
Brown v. District Court, 72 Mont. 213, 232 P. 201 (1925). But see, United States Fi-
delity and Guaranty Company v. State, 121 Miss. 369, 83 So. 610 (1920) (information
from mayor not sufficient). Also in United States v. Clark, 29 F.Supp. 138 (D.C.W.D.
Mo. 1939) on petition for rehearing, the prosecution unsuccessfully argued that even
though the narcotics agents did not have probable cause, the local police officers who
were with them did since the local police got their information from the narcotics
agents who constituted a "credible official source."
39. 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956).
40. 47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931).
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in the absence of corroborating evidence observed by the officers prior
to the arrest, such as seeing alcohol cases in the rear of the suspect's car.41
It should also be required that the probability of the predicter-informant's
accuracy be high. In the Wisniewski case, the informant had demon-
strated his accuracy by prior performance." In Davis v. State,3 the
probability of accuracy was shown by the fact that the predicter was the
sheriff of another county who was well acquainted with the suspect's
criminal activities.
Since it is required not only that the informant claim first hand
knowledge of the facts, but also that the informant be credible, informa-
tion from a confessed felon"4 or jail prisoners45 is not sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause. However, in Diers v. Mallonj the informant, a con-
fessed murderer, told the sheriff that the plaintiff had hired him to com-
mit the killing. The murderer's attorney and a judge also told the sheriff
that they had heard the deceased, prior to the killing, make the statement
that if he was ever murdered, it would be the plaintiff's doing. Thus
the word of an incredible informant found sufficient support from the
statements of credible informants to validate the arrest. Information
from a known criminal contains little assurance of truth, and if reliance
were allowed on such information, no protection would be afforded the
accused. Likewise if the identity of the informant is unknown, as in an
anonymous telephone message,4" or his character is unknown as in a re-
ward advertisement in a magazine,"' then no reliance can reasonably be
placed on his information.
(2) Warrant for Arrest
In the case of an arrest without a warrant, the court always exam-
ines the question of probable cause in retrospect, asking, "Did this of fi-
cer at the time of the arrest have probable cause?" However, when an
arrest warrant is requested, the magistrate decides the justification of an
arrest not yet consummated and the question is, "Does the magistrate
41. Davis v. State, 203 Ind. 443, 180 N.E. 595 (1931).
42. Accord, Husty v. United States 282 U.S. 694 (1930) ; but see United States v.
Hill 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
43. 203 Ind. 443, 180 N.E. 595 (1931).
44. Wills v. Jordon, 20 R.I. 630, 41 Atl. 233 (1898).
45. United States v. Baldacci, 42 F.2d 567 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1930).
46. 46 Neb. 121, 64 N.W. 722, 50 Am. St. Rep. 598 (1895).
47. People v. Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 194 N.W. 561 (1923) (dictum).
48. State ex rel. Hartley v. Evans, 83 Mo. App. 301 (1900) ; accord, Simmons v.
Van Dyke, 138 Ind. 380, 37 N.E. 973, 46 Am. St. Rep. 411 (1894) (telegram from
foreign police chief not sufficient, also possible question of extradition procedure);
Jones v. Wilson, 119 La. 491, 44 So. 275 (1907) (telegram from private citizen not
sufficient). Contra, Burton v. N.Y. Central and Hartford R.R. Co., 147 App. Div. 557,
132 N.Y. Supp. 628 (1911).
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now have probable cause?" An arresting officer must determine the
credibility of his informant. Likewise the magistrate must make such
an evaluation. If an indictment has been returned then the magistrate
must issue a warrant for arrest.49 However, if only a complaint or in-
formation has been filed, the magistrate must determine if the facts con-
tained therein are sufficient to constitute probable cause.5"
It has been shown that an arrest without a warrant will not be per-
mitted when the informant remains anonymous,5 nor will it be per-
mitted when nothing more is known about the informant than his name
appearing on a reward advertisement.2 The officer must have some
reasonable basis for a determination of the credibility of the informant,
and a name in a magazine does not afford protection from falsity. This
same reasoning applies when the magistrate is presented with an informa-
tion from the prosecutor who swears that another has informed him that
the accused has committed an offense. Even though on the basis of
such an information prosecution could be instigated, third-hand evidence
is not sufficient to allow a warrant for arrest to issue." An affidavit
which rests solely on unsworn statements by an informant who does not
appear before the magistrate is not sufficient. 4 In People v. Manzel,5"
the affiant swore on information and belief that the defendant had sold
wood alcohol for human consumption and named the three informants
who were the source of his information. The court held the affidavit
insufficient for a warrant for arrest. In United States v. Longsdale,6
the affidavit was not sufficient when the assistant United States District
Attorney swore that he had reports from named government agents who
had examined the books of the defendant.
Although the magistrate may not issue a warrant when the only
assurance he has of the credibility of the informant is the affidavit of
the officer, it is not required that the informant appear before the court.
In the absence of an opportunity for the court to examine the informant,
a sworn affidavit from the informant will take the place of such an ap-
49. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932); ORFIELD, Op. Cit. $1pra note 1
at 264-5.
50. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1 at 10-11.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. See note 48 supra.
53. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1926) ; Keilman v. United States, 284
Fed. 845 (5th Cir. 1922) ; Vanatta v. State, 31 Ind. 210 (1869). Contra, Griffin v.
State, 137 Tex. Crim. 231, 128 S.W.2d 1197 (1939) ; Frick v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 100,
124 S.W. 922 (1910) and cases cited therein.
54. It is of no significance that the accused could have been arrested by the officer
without a warrant on the same information. Ex parte Bennett, 258 App. Div. 368, 16
N.Y. Supp. 2d. 901 (1940).
55. 148 Misc. 916, 267 N.Y. Supp. 23 (1933).
56. 115 F.Supp. (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1953).
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pearance. In People v. Flang,7 when the district attorney attached the
sworn affidavits of his informants as part of his own affidavit on in-
formation and belief, the court sustained the warrant. The reliance of
the court on the oath and threat of prosecution for perjury as protection
from false information is further demonstrated by People v. Belcher, 8
where the signed statements of the informants were attached to the af-
fidavit of the officers; the affidavit was held insufficient since the sup-
porting statements were not sworn. Likewise in Albrecht v. United
States,"9 the affidavit was not sufficient when the supporting statements
were sworn before a notary. The courts by imposing the requirement of
a sworn affidavit from the informant merely insist that the determina-
tion of credibility remain with the magistrate and not be delegated to the
affiant. Only by a sworn affidavit from the informant is the credibility
of the information proved to the court's satisfaction." Aside from the
question of whether the protection from false information afforded by
the oath deserves such reliance, it might be possible for the magistrate to
determine the credibility of such information in certain circumstances
even without sworn statements from the informant, and hence a strict ad-
herence to such a requirement may not be justified. It is probably true
that an unsworn oral statement by the informant before the magistrate
or a sworn affidavit by the officer setting out facts about the informant's
character and reputation could furnish a basis from which the magistrate
could intelligently estimate the credibility of the informant. A sworn
statement from the officer that his information came from a minister, as
in the Budreau case,"1 would afford greater probability of truth than a
sworn statement from the murderer-informant himself in the Diers case.6"
From a comparison of the prosecution and arrest cases, the follow-
ing conclusions appear: Although many state courts still allow the ac-
cused to question the evidence presented to the grand jury,6" in view of
the Costello case such an attack will not be permitted in federal courts.
The indictment, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial, and the
accused may not avoid the harms attendant to trial by showing defici-
encies in the evidence presented to the grand jury. 4 Likewise the state
courts do not agree on the protection to be afforded the accused from an
57. 188 Misc. 26, 66 N.Y. Supp.2d 254 (1946).
58. 302 N.Y. 529, 99 N.E.2d 874 (1951).
59. 273 U.S. 1 (1926).
60. Cf. Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73 (1904) ; where the deponent svore on in-
formation and belief that the accused was under indictment in another district and at-
tached a certified copy of the indictment.
61. See note 28 supra.
62. See note 46 supra.
63. See note 4 supra.
64. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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unfounded prosecution by information, some states making no provision
whatever for a preliminary hearing,65 others affording review of the
evidence before the magistrate.6" On the other hand, the arrest cases
show that there is general agreement that the arrested party may attack
th informational base of an arrest. Although an arrest without a war-
rant is allowed on the basis of second-hand information, 7 the courts have
qualified their approval by requirements running to the credibility of the
informant, "8 the claim by the informant of eye-witness knowledge," and
the understanding by the officer that his informant does claim such
knowledge prior to arrest."0
For a warrant for arrest to issue, the magistrate must be presented
with sworn affidavits from eye-witnesses before the warrant will be
allowed.71 Thus the magistrate must have much the same sort of evi-
dence before him as is required for the officer to arrest without a war-
rant. Each of these requirements affords a safeguard from groundless
arrest.
The reason given for refusal to review the evidence presented to the
grand jury is the delay in criminal proceedings which would be caused
by allowing a preliminary trial to re-examine the evidence on which the
indictment is founded." No such delay is caused by allowing an attack
on the informational base of an arrest, since the question in issue is not
whether the prosecution should proceed, but only whether the defendant
was taken into custody properly. Also, the harms incident to criminal
prosecution have not been traditionally afforded the judicial protection
surrounding those suffered in arrest. Prosecution need not entail re-
straining the physical liberty of the accused; however, such restraint is
always attendant to arrest, and physical liberty has long been held in high
esteem.
Even if it is admitted that expeditious prosecution of suspected of-
fenders demands a lesser degree of protection from the harms incident to
trial, the reasoning is not wholly consistent when applied to the indict-
ment, for an indictment not only serves to institgate prosecution, but
also automatically authorizes the issue of a warrant for arrest.73 An
information based upon third-hand evidence, although it may instigate
65. See note 21 supra.
66. See note 22 supra.
67. See note 27 supra.
68. See notes 44 and 45 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 53 supra.
72. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 49 supra.
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porsecution, cannot support a warrant for arrest. 4 Although it may be
justifiable that a review of the evidence before the grand jury should
not be allowed for purposes of contesting the validity of the indictment
as a means of prosecution, it does not necessarily follow that such review
should also be denied for purposes of contesting the indictment as a
basis for a warrant for arrest. The grand jury inquest itself affords
only an illusory protection from indictments returned on facts insuffi-
cient to constitute probable cause for both prosecution and arrest; hence
if the interests invaded by arrest are to be afforded substantial protec-
tion, the evidentiary base of the indictment, like that of the information,
should be subject to scrutiny when the indictment is used as a basis for
a warrant for arrest. 5
Search
A search may be conducted either as an incident to a lawful arrest,7 6
or on the basis of a search warrant issued by the magistrate.7 Facts
must be shown before the magistrate indicating that the premises to be
searched are in 'some way involved in a suspected offense and that there
is probable cause to believe that a search will disclose evidence of that
offense." This determination, like that involved in a warrant for arrest,
is based upon an examination of sworn affidavits or testimony presented
to the magistrate.7" If the witness or affiant claims personal knowledge
of the facts, then the magistrate receives his information second-hand.
If the witness or affiant's statement is based on hearsay, the magistrate's
information is third-hand. Even taking into consideration the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,"0
since the private interests invaded by a search are primarily property in-
terests rather than those of the physical person, it would seem that a less
stringent standard might be applied to the evidence than that imposed
for a warrant for arrest. In addition there is necessity for swift action
when a search warrant is requested. If there is excessive delay the sole
evidence of a crime may be moved or destroyed in the interim and the
only means of convicting the accused lost forever. Courts have taken
divergent views of the effect which the interplay of the fourth amend-
ment and the pressure toward haste has upon the evidence required before
74. See note 53 supra.
75. Cf. ORMELD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 180-181.
76. See CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra note 27 at 151-162. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1
at 42-43.
77. See CORNELIUS, op. cit. supra note 27 at 234.
78. Id. at 248-250.
79. Id. at 246-264.
80. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
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the magistrate. There is general agreement that the sufficiency of evi-
dence before a magistrate may be re-examined by the court when deter-
mining the validity of a search warrant;"1 however, the evidentiary
standard applied determines the practical protection such review affords
the accused.
Apparently feeling that the different considerations involved do not
justify a different degree of protection, some courts would equate the
search warrant with a warrant for arrest and would impose the same re-
quirements for each: a sworn affidavit from the informant himself and
not merely a report that reaches the magigstrate third-hand.8 2 In Rohlf-
ing v. State,8" the affiant swore that one Youngman had told him that he
had purchased a certain gun from the defendant and had seen other guns
at the defendant's home. Even though the Chief of Police had identified
the purchased gun as stolen the warrant was not allowed. Nor was the
affidavit sufficient in Schenks v. United States4 where the affiant swore
that one Redyns had told him that he had purchased a vial of cocaine
from the defendant at his premisis, giving the date of the purchase and
the price. By imposing the requirement of a sworn affidavit, the magis-
trate retains complete control of the determination of probable cause and
must be presented with the same proof as an officer who arrests without
a warrant. Under such a standard, third-hand evidence would never
suffice, the risks involved apparently outweighing the pressure toward
quick issue of search warrants.
Other courts apparently feel that the public interest in prompt seiz-
ure of evidence demands that a lesser degree of protection be afforded
and allow a search warrant to issue in the absence of a sworn statement
from the informant if the officer names his informant and sets out the
information with particularity in his affidavit. 5 In Goode v. Common-
81. See CORNELIUS, Op. cit. supra note 27 at 295-6.
82. Davis v. United States, 35 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1929); People v. Perrin, 223
Mich. 132, 193 N.W. 888 (1925); People v. Woodhouse, 223 Mich. 608, 194 N.W. 545
(1925) ; People v. Maniscalco, 205 App. Div. 483, 199 N.Y. Supp. 444 (1923) ; James v.
States, 43 Okla. Crim. 192, 277 P. 682 (1929) ; Cf. Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61
(6th Cir. 1937) (Warrant sufficient when informant testified before magistrate but
did not issue affidavit).
83. 227 Ind. 619, 88 N.E.2d 148 (1949).
84. 2 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
85. Hawker v. Queck, 1 F.2d 77 (3rd Cir. 1924) ; cert. denied, 266 U.S. 621 (1924)
(sufficient when affidavits from informant sworn before notary) ; Owens v. Common-
wealth, 309 Ky. 478, 218 S.W.2d 49 (1949) (affidavit not sufficient when informant
identified only as "a boy by the name of Smith") ; Waggener v. McCanless, 183 Tenn.
258, 191 S.W.2d 551, 162 A.L.R. 1402 (1946) (warrant upheld when informant's name
given to magistrate although not set out in affidavit) ; Griffeth v. Commonwealth, 209
Ky. 143, 272 S.W. 403 (1925) ; Coleman v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 139, 292 S.W. 771
(1927) (affidavits insufficient which do not show when informant obtained his infor-
mation and when he relayed information to affiant) ; Arnold v. Commonwealth, 206
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wealth,8" the Kentucky court upheld the search warrant when the affiant
swore that one Mansfield had told him that he had seen whiskey in bot-
tles and jars at the defendant's home that morning. In Bland v. State,"
the Maryland court which allows search warrants based on sufficient in-
formation from "named responsible official sources" sustained the war-
rant when the affiant, a police Sergeant, swore that he had sent a Cpl.
Kessler to watch the defendant's building and that Kessler had reported
about thirty persons per day entering defendant's apartment without
knocking, all prior to 2 p. m., which was known to be the deadline for
"numbers" to be entered each day.8" Allowing a search warrant to issue
on the basis of third-hand information implies either that because of the
necessity of haste, a lesser degree of probability of truth is required of
the information justifying the issue of a search warrant, or that because
the affiant is an officer, the probability of accurate transmission is great
enough that the information has substantially the same probative value
as if the informant himself were before the magistrate. Even if this
latter proposition were true, the magistrate must still have some basis
upon which to determine the credibility of the informant. If, as in the
Bland case,8" the informant is a law enforcement officer, the magistrate
is perhaps afforded some assurance that his information can be believed.
However, without such an assurance it is difficult to see how the in-
formant's name alone, in the absence of personal knowledge by the court
of the character of the person named, can form the basis for determina-
tion of credibility. As was indicated in the arrest cases, a name alone
generally carries little guarantee of credibility.9" Additional facts con-
cerning the character of the informant should be required. If such facts
are not required then the determination of credibility of the informant
is delegated to the affiant.
Even4vhere the magistrate may receive his information third-hand,
it is still required that the informant claim personal knowledge of the
facts. In Pezzerossi v. Commonwealth,9 the affiant swore that his
daughter said that intoxicating liquors were being manufactured on the
defendant's land. The warrant was not sustained since the daughter had
merely stated a conclusion and had not relayed the facts on which the
Ky. 347, 267 S.W. 190 (1924) (affidavit insufficient which did not show information
connecting premises to be searched with suspected crime).
86. 199 Ky. 755, 252 S.W. 105 (1923).
87. 197 Md. 546, 80 A.2d 43 (1951).
88. Accord, Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 62 A.2d 287, 5 A.L.R.2d 386 (1948), cert.
den cd, 336 U.S. 925 (1949) ; Poston v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 187, 256 S.W. 25 (1923)
(prediction by foreign chief of police not sufficient).
89. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 48 supra.
91. 214 Ky. 240, 282 S.W. 1097 (1926).
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conclusion was based. Even if the magistrate need not be presented
with evidence tending to establish the informant's credibility, if facts
tending to destroy credibility appear in the affidavit, then the search
warrant may not issue. Just as the arrest cases indicate when the affida-
vit shows that the information came from a burglary suspect, 2 or a
drunken derelict, 3 it is not sufficient. In effect, when the name of the
informant is given, a presumption of credibility is raised, however, when
facts to the contrary appear then the presumption vanishes and the war-
rant must be denied. Aside from whether the exigencies of law enforce-
ment demand a more relaxed standard of proof in the search warrant
area, at least a certain negative protection is afforded since the magis-
trate may not issue the warrant when it affirmatively appears that there
is not sufficient probability that the informant is credible.
If, except for the qualification that the magistrate is given leave
to receive his information third-hand, probable cause for the magistrate
is like that of a peace officer arresting without a warrant, then it would
follow that probable cause could not be found if the name of the in-
formant is not given.94 Although this is the position taken by most
courts,95 it is not the rule in Texas. In Luera v. State,9" the affiant swore
that unnamed informants had told him that they had bought liquor from
the defendant at his home within the last twenty-four hours. This state-
ment alone was held sufficient to support the warrant."' Even though
the affiant swears that his informant claims personal knowledge of the
facts, the magistrate has no information before him tending to show that
the informant can be believed. Granting the warrant under such cir-
cumstances involves a complete delegation to the affiant of the evalua-
tion of the credibility of his informant. When the affidavit is sub-
92. People v. Elias, 316 Ill. 376, 147 N.E. 472 (1925).
93. People v. De Vasto, 198 App. Div. 620, 190 N.Y. Supp. 816 (1921).
94. The identity of the informant who claims to have witnessed the offense need
not be given when the officers personally sent the informant into the suspected premesis
empty-handed and he emerged carrying illegal property he had purchased. Shore v.
United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1931) ; Schroder v. United States, 53 F.2d 6
(5th Cir. 1931) ; People v. Woods, 228 Mich. 87, 199 N.W. 603 (1924).
95. DeLancy v. City of Miami (Fla.), 43 So.2d 856, 14 A.L.R.2d 602 (1950);
Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 143 So. 253 (1932) ; State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254
P. 188, 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927); Derefield v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 173, 298 S.W. 382
(1927); Hammond v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 791, 292 S.W. 316 (1927); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 216, 298 S.W. 685 (1927); State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234
N.W. 610 (1930) ; King v. State (Tenn.), 174 S.W.2d 463 (1943) ; Glodowski v. State,
196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928) ; Hession v. State, 196 Wis. 435, 220 N.W. 232
(1928).
96. 124 Tex. Crim. 507, 63 S.W.2d 699 (1933).
97. Accord, Douglas v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 29, 161 S.W.2d 92 (1942) ; Hamilton
v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 154, 48 S.W.2d 1005 (1932) ; Loftin v. State, 116 Tex. Crim.
244, 33 S.W.2d 1071 (1930) ; Villareal v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 442, 21 S.W.2d 739
(1929). But cf. Matlock v. State, 155 Tenn. 624, 299 S.W. 796 (1927).
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mitted, the question of credibility is closed, and the only determination
left to the magistrate is the sufficiency of the facts which the informant
purported to have observed. The risk of untruth in such a standard is
manifest. However, the Texas position is even more extreme. It is not
even required that the affiant set out whether the informant claimed
that his information was based on personal knowledge. 0
In Schwartz v. State,99 the affidavit was held sufficient, when the
affiant swore only that reputable persons had told him that whiskey was
being made on the defendant's land.' Likewise, in Ruhman v. State,''
the affiant swore that he was "reliably informed" that liquors were kept
and sold on the defendant's premisis. The warrant was held valid. Such
a position gives the officer carte blanche to search since it involves a
complete delegation to the affiant of the determination of probable cause
and a virtual abdication of the magistrate from his function. Under the
Texas rule although the courts purport to grant review, since the evi-
dentiary standard of a search warrant would be equatable to that of an
indictment in the federal system, the protection afforded is no more than
if no review of the evidence were allowed. The function of the magis-
trate is mere ritual and the only protection afforded is the conscience of
the affiant. If the public interest demanded that searches be accom-
plished on the basis of any evidence satisfactory to the officer, then the
requirements of a display of evidence before a magistrate and the pro-
curement of a warrant should have been abolished long ago as a needless
delay. Such is not the case. Although the standards applied to the evi-
dence before the magistrate vary among the courts, only Texas would
allow such remote correlation between the facts in the affidavit and the
probability of their truth.
98. Contra, Kohler v. United States, 9 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1925) ; United States v.
Dzadius, 289 Fed. 837 (D.C.W.Va. 1923) ; Carroll v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 748, 181
S.W.2d 259 (1944); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 217, 179 S.W.2d 899 (1944);
Hyde v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 673, 258 S.W. 107 (1924); Register v. Patterson, 13
N.D. 70, 99 N.W. 67 (1904); Hall v. State, 34 Okla. Crim. 334, 246 P. 642 (1932);
Cole v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 396, 262 P. 712 (1928); Johnson v. State, 153 Tenn. 431,
284 S.W. 356 (1925); State v. Ripley, 196 Wis. 238, 220 N.W. 235 (1928); State v.
Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282 (1924); cf. Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So.2d
164 (1942) ; Wagner v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 821, 251 S.W. 1021 (1923) (although in-
formant unnamed, affidavit sworn to personal knowledge of facts substantiating infor-
mation).
99. 120 Tex. Crim. 252, 46 S.W.2d 985 (1931).
100. Accord, Magee v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 161, 118 S.W.2d 591 (1938) ; Siragusa
v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 263, 54 S.W.2d 107 (1932) ; Duncan v. State, 118 Tex. Crim.
253, 37 S.W.2d 1034 (1931) ; Rozner v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 127, 3 S.W.2d 441 (1928).
But cf. Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 751, 261 S.W. 277 (1924).
101. 113 Tex. Crim. 527, 22 S.W.2d 1069 (1929).
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Conclusion
Although the term probable cause is used to describe the rational
persuasiveness of the evidence necessary to instigate prosecution, search
and arrest, there are significant differences in the evidence needed for
each. The liublic interest protected as well as the private interest invaded
by each action influence the granting of judicial review as well as the
evidentiary standard to be applied. Although there are major jurisdic-
tional differences as to the capability of hearsay to achieve the required
degree of probability for each action, the standards indicate a substan-
tially lower degree of probability required to initiate prosecution than
that required for arrest and search. The validity of such standards de-
pends in part on a realistic appraisal of the consequences of criminal
prosecution, arrest, and search in contemporary society.
PROVING THE FALSITY OF ADVERTISING: THE McANNULTY
RULE AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
In 1902 the Supreme Court, in American School of Magnetic Heal-
ing v. McAnnulty, set out a principle which prescribed one of the boun-
daries of a valid Post Office fraud order. In the past half century, re-
spondents in administrative proceedings under several federal statutes
have urged the principle as substantiation for such a variety of conten-
tions that considerable confusion has resulted.2
At the turn of the century, a number of organizations advocated the
proposition that the mind of a human being was largely responsible for
the ills of the body, and was a discernible factor in the treating and curing
1. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
2. An indication of the variety of contentions can be had from noting the several
situations for which applicability of the rule has been urged. It was significant in three
criminal mail fraud cases: Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928) ; Bruce
v. United States, 202 Fed. 98 (8th Cir. 1912) ; Harrison v. United States, 200 Fed. 662
(6th Cir. 1912). Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion to Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920), applied the principle of McAnnulty to statements made by defend-
ants convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. The rule has also been advanced
in argument in various civil and state court cases. Dilliard v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866 (1921) (revocation of doctor's license) ; Fougera
& Co. v. City of New York, 224 N.Y. 269, 120 N.E. 642 (1918) (violation of sanitation
ordinance-failure to disclose contents or curative effect of medicine on the label);
Moxie Nerve Food Co. v. Holland, 141 Fed. 202 (D. R.I. 1905) (in defense to a suit
brought to enjoin the distribution of a product with a confusingly similar name) ; Welt-
mer v. Bishop, 171 Mo. 110, 71 S.W. 167 (1902) (suit for libel by partners in an
organization similar to the American School of Magnetic Healing; motion for rehearing
based on the decision in the McAnnulty case, denied).
